Abstract -This paper discusses the regulation of mass metadata surveillance in Europe through the lens of the landmark judgment in which the Court of Justice of the European Union struck down the Data Retention Directive. The controversial directive obliged telecom and Internet access providers in Europe to retain metadata of all their customers for intelligence and law enforcement purposes, for a period of up to two years. In the ruling, the Court declared the directive in violation of the human rights to privacy and data protection. The Court also confirmed that the mere collection of metadata interferes with the human right to privacy. In addition, the Court developed three new criteria for assessing the level of data security required from a human rights perspective: security measures should take into account the risk of unlawful access to data, and the data's quantity and sensitivity. While 
INTRODUCTION

In 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated the Data Retention
Directive. 3 The directive obliged all telecom providers in the European Union to retain metadata of all their customers for intelligence and law enforcement purposes, for a period of up to two years. This paper focuses on the following question. What are the implications of the Data Retention judgment for data collection as an interference with privacy, for data security requirements, and for the regulation of mass surveillance law in Europe?
We begin with an introduction to the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data in Europe (Part II). Next, we summarize the main elements of the Data Retention Directive, and the Data Retention judgment (Part III). While we do not aim to conduct comparative research in this paper, we do highlight some salient points where EU and US law differ. 4 Our aim with this section is to explain to an international readership the complicated European constitutional situation, with its two institutional systems (the Council of Europe and the European Union) and its two constitutional courts.
Then the paper takes a more analytical turn. We focus on three themes: (i) data collection as a privacy interference, (ii) data security requirements, and (iii) the proceduralization of mass surveillance law. Part IV discusses criteria for metadata collection and access to such data after the judgment. The Court of Justice of the European Union reaffirms that collecting metadata about people interferes with privacy, regardless of how the data are used.
Part V discusses the judgment's implications for data security. The Court develops three new criteria for assessing the level of data security needed from a human rights perspective. Data security measures should take into account the quantity and the sensitivity of data, and the risk of unlawful access to data. The ruling will have a large impact beyond the regulation of surveillance, as it develops a completely new framework for the regulation of data security in the EU The Court substantially raises the obligations for the EU lawmaker to protect data security in legislation.
In Part VI we warn against proceduralization of surveillance law. The Court did not fully condemn mass surveillance that relies on metadata. Rather, the Court set out procedural conditions that must be met to conduct mass surveillance in compliance with the law. It seems that, as long as the procedures are taken care of, far-reaching privacy violations can be claimed to be lawful. In Part VII we discuss the road ahead for mass data surveillance in Europe, and Part VIII concludes.
II PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION RIGHTS IN EUROPE
In this Part we give an introduction to the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data in Europe. First we introduce the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, both connected to the Council of Europe (Section II A and II B). Then we turn to the European Union: we discuss the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the EU data privacy directives, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (Section II C -II E).
A. European Convention on Human Rights
The right to privacy is an internationally recognized human right, and is included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 5 In Europe, the right to privacy is laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty of the Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to respect for private life. In this paper, we use "privacy" and "private life" interchangeably.
9
Article 8 reads as follows.
European Convention on Human Rights
Article 8, right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
In brief, article 8 prohibits privacy interferences. Paragraph 2 shows that this prohibition isn't absolute; in many circumstances the state can limit the right to privacy in the view of other interests, such as crime prevention or national security.
Article 8 has been applied in several cases on surveillance, as discussed in the next section. 7 Council of Europe, Who We Are, www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are, accessed 25 July 2015. 8 Council of Europe, Country Profiles, www.coe.int/en/web/portal/country-profiles, accessed 25 July 2015. 9 On the difference between "privacy" and "private life", see: GLORIA GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, THE 
EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU (PhD thesis
Free
B. European Court of Human Rights
The The European Court of Human Rights has ruled on several cases regarding targeted surveillance, 21 and on two cases on mass surveillance. 22 The Court is very critical of national laws that allow secret surveillance measures. In the Court's words: "in view of the risk that a system of secret surveillance for the protection of national security may undermine or even destroy democracy under the cloak of defending it, the Court must be satisfied that there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse."
23
The mere fact that a country allows mass surveillance interferes with privacy. As the Court puts it:
[T]he mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may be applied. In addition to the right to privacy, the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights contains a separate right to the protection of personal data in article 8, which reads as follows:
Protection of personal data 1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.
The right to data protection in the Charter summarizes some core elements of the Data Protection Directive, which we discuss next.
D. European Union Data Privacy Directives
In 1995, the EU adopted the Data Protection Directive. 36 One of the aims of the directive is to "protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. The e-Privacy Directive says, in short, that traffic and location data must be erased when they're no longer required for billing or for conveying a communication, unless the user has given consent for another use. to access the internet. 55 Location data are data "indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available electronic communications service". 56 Location data may show, for instance, the location of a cell phone user.
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For readability reasons, this paper also speaks of metadata to refer to traffic and location data. In summary, the e-Privacy Directive lays down a strict regime for telecom providers when dealing with metadata.
But article 15 of the e-Privacy Directive contains an important exception to the strict regime for traffic and location data. exception to the metadata privacy regime of the e-Privacy Directive. We discuss the Data Retention Directive in more detail in Section III A.
In summary, the e-Privacy Directive lays down a strict and privacy-friendly regime for metadata. Telecom providers must erase or anonymize metadata, unless they are necessary for billing, and only for as long as so necessary. But article 15 makes a hole in that regime. Since the 2006 amendment through the Data Retention Directive, the hole of article 15 has turned into a gaping crater.
E. Court of Justice of the European Union
The Court of Justice of the European Union is one of the core EU institutions, and is based in Luxemburg. 61 The Court background the Court of Justice of the European Union had to decide the Data Retention case, which we discuss next.
B. The Data Retention Judgment
In Rights of the European Union. 81 These rights concern privacy (article 7), the protection of personal data (article 8), and freedom of expression (article 11).
The Court of Justice of the European Union invalidates the directive, because the EU lawmaker exceeded the limits imposed by the privacy and data protection rights of the Charter. The Court says it is "not inconceivable" that data retention interferes with people's freedom of expression as well. 82 But, as it invalidates the directive already on other grounds, the Court sees no need to examine the directive in the light of freedom of expression. 83 In this paper we also focus on privacy and data protection rights, rather than on freedom of expression. 
IV MASS METADATA COLLECTION INTERFERES WITH PRIVACY
Below we discuss the implications of the judgment, focusing on three themes: data collection as a privacy interference (Part IV), data security requirements (Part V), and the proceduralization of surveillance law (Part VI).
A. Interference with Privacy and Data Protection Rights
In the data retention judgment, In the end, the Court strikes down the Data Retention Directive because the interference with privacy and data protection rights is disproportional. The Court sees the interference as disproportional because the directive does not comply with certain, mostly procedural, requirements. We discuss the risk of too much focus on procedures (rather than on substantive safeguards) in Part VI, on the proceduralization of surveillance law. Now we first turn to data security requirements that follow from human rights case law.
V DATA SECURITY REQUIREMENTS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
In this Part we discuss the requirements for data security that follow from human rights case law in Europe, and from the Data Retention Directive in particular.
Although the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidates the Data Retention
Directive because it entails a disproportionate interference with privacy and data protection rights, 105 the Court also discusses the lack of data security safeguards in the directive.
A. The Data Retention Judgment on Data Security
The Court of Justice of the European Union says that the fundamental right to data protection requires effective data security standards, and that the Data Retention Directive fails in this respect. Subsequently, the Court presents a new analytical framework to assess when the EU lawmaker must adopt legal data security safeguards to comply with the Charter's right to data protection. In the future, the EU lawmaker must consider the following three factors when legislating data security: (i) the quantity of data, (ii) the sensitivity of data, and (iii) the risk of unlawful access to data. 108 In the Court's words: paper we focus on the data security requirements, rather than on data localization as a safeguard for effective supervision.
The Court's requirement of ensuring "full integrity and confidentiality" of data uses the same language as a widely used definition of information security, known as the c.i.a.-triad. According to this definition, "security" assures the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data, programs, and other system resources for authorized users. 112 The c.i.a. triad was developed academic literature in the early 1970s, 113 and remains influential in systems design and technical standards.
In sum, based on human rights, the Court lays down strict data security requirements for stored metadata and personal data. Moreover, as we discuss in the next Section, the Court does not accept it if data security is influenced too much by economic considerations.
B. Security Economics
The Court suggests that a cost-benefit analysis by private parties does not provide sufficient data security safeguards. According to the Court, the Data Retention "does not ensure that a particularly high level of protection and security is applied by breaches in industries such online banking, operating systems development, and electronic health. 118 The Court seems to agree with security economics scholars:
companies' economic considerations do not necessarily provide sufficient data security.
The data security provision in the Data Retention Directive (Article 7) refers to the data security provisions in the e-Privacy Directive 119 and the Data Protection
Directive. 120 The Court rules that the combined data security provisions of the three directives fail to provide a sufficient data security. 121 These three provisions embody the core of the current approach to legislating data and communications security in the EU. The three data security provisions illustrate the usual way in which the EU lawmaker legislates data security: the law prescribes security measures that take into account risks and costs. sensitivity and the risks of abuse -are clearly at play. Hence, these proposals contradict the data security requirements from the Data Retention judgment, and seem destined for the EU Court when adopted in their current form.
In sum, the Data Retention judgment sets much stricter obligations for the EU lawmaker to ensure data security. European courts now require data security through legislation that is practical and effective, and protects the "full integrity and confidentiality" of data, especially when information quantity, sensitivity and abuse risks are at play.
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VI THE PROCEDURALIZATION OF MASS SURVEILLANCE LAW
A. The Data Retention Judgment: Proportionality Assessment
In this Section, we discuss the risk of proceduralization of mass surveillance law. The Court invalidates the directive because, taking all circumstances into account, the Directive entails a disproportionate interference with human rights. First, we summarize why the Court of Justice of the European Union finds the Data Retention directive so disproportionate that it is invalid.
As noted, the Court accepts that the directive serves an objective of general interest: public security. 137 But an objective of general interest is not enough; article 52(1) of the Charter also requires attention to proportionality. 138 In the Court's words, "the principle of proportionality requires that acts of the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those objectives." 139 The Court says that, because of the "seriousness of the interference" with human rights, the EU lawmaker's discretion is reduced.
140
The Court deals step-by-step with the proportionality test. First: appropriateness. The
Court says data retention is a valuable tool for criminal investigations, and therefore appropriate to pursue the directive's objective. 141 The Court admits that several methods of electronic communication fall outside the scope of the directive, limiting its effectiveness. 142 But for the Court such loopholes do not make the directive an inappropriate measure.
143
The second question of the proportionality test asks whether data retention is "necessary" to achieve the objective pursued. The Court concludes that the directive goes further than necessary, and gives three arguments. 152 First, the data retention requirement applies to everyone, without exceptions, 153 and even applies to people whose communications are subject to professional secrecy. 154 Moreover, the directive "does not require any relationship between the data whose retention is provided for and a threat to public security." 155 And the directive's retention requirements are not restricted to data regarding a particular period or area, or to crime suspects. 156 Second, the directive is disproportionate because it does not specify the conditions under which authorities can access the data, and does not specify which crimes are serious enough to justify such access. 157 Moreover, complains the Court, the directive does not require that a court or similar body carry out a prior review if authorities seek access to the retained data. 158 Third, the Court notes that the directive requires that many types of metadata are retained for at least six months, while no distinction is made between types of data, on the basis of how useful they are for the fight against terrorism and serious crime. In conclusion, the Court invalidates the directive because it entails a disproportionate interference with privacy and data protection rights. The Court does not say that mass metadata retention is always incompatible with human rights.
B. Proceduralization in Human Rights Case Law
We warn against the risk of the proceduralization of mass surveillance law. While we agree with the end result of the Data Retention judgment -declaring the entire directive void -we do not agree that mass metadata surveillance is acceptable, as long as there are sufficient procedural safeguards.
The arguments of the Court of Justice of the European Union for invalidating the directive are largely procedural arguments. Taking a skeptical view, the judgment could be read as a checklist for lawmakers to design a mass data retention obligation that does comply with the Charter's proportionality requirement.
The Court lists several procedural arguments why the Data Retention Directive is a disproportionate measure. In brief: (i) the directive lacks safeguards regarding law enforcement access to data, 161 and (ii) lacks specified retention periods for different metadata types in relation to their usefulness for law enforcement. 162 In addition, the Court complains about (iii) insufficient data security safeguards, and (iv) the lack of a 180 In sum, as many scholars note, the distinction between communications content and metadata is passé. 181 Metadata are at least as sensitive as communication content.
Procedural safeguards are important. 182 But we do not think that procedural safeguards are sufficient to regulate mass metadata surveillance. Even with procedural safeguards, mass surveillance is unacceptable.
VII THE FUTURE OF MASS DATA RETENTION IN EUROPE
In this Part we discuss the road ahead for mass surveillance in the EU. "Western Europe at the turn of the 21st century" is, as Pinker puts it, "the safest place in human history". 183 Nevertheless, some EU countries find it important to adopt mass surveillance measures.
Blanket metadata retention can still exist in Europe for two reasons. First, the invalidity of the Data Retention Directive does not mean that the national implementing acts automatically became invalid too. 184 With the Data Retention judgment, the legal obligation for EU Member States to implement the Data Retention Directive evaporated. But article 15(1) of the e-Privacy Directive still provides a possibility for Member States to adopt data retention obligations.
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Article 15(1) of the e-Privacy Directive permits national laws that require data retention, but only under strict conditions. Therefore, a national data retention regime must be, for instance, necessary, appropriate, and proportionate. In addition to the requirements of article 15, national data retention laws must observe the requirements of the Data Retention judgment. 186 But under those conditions, national data retention laws are still legally possible.
A second reason why blanket metadata retention is still possible in Europe is that the Data Retention judgment has not outlawed such mass surveillance measures per se.
Hence, the EU lawmaker could still adopt a new Data Retention Directive, while aiming to comply with the judgment's strict procedural requirements. The Data
Retention judgment does not make clear whether the sole fact that mass surveillance affects all Europeans makes such surveillance disproportionate.
At the national level, the response to the judgment has been mixed. The result is a
European patchwork for data retention. 187 After the Data Retention judgment, courts in Austria, 188 Slovenia, 189 and Romania 190 quickly annulled the national implementation laws. In Belgium and the Netherlands, judges have invalidated national data retention laws after public interest groups challenged those laws. 191 Conversely, countries such as the UK, still maintain national data retention schemes.
192
In December 2014, a Member of the European Commission suggested that the Commission had started to work on a new Data Retention Directive. The
Commissioner stated that he was examining "how", rather than "if", to re-introduce data retention. 193 After an outburst of critique from public interest groups, the next day a Commission spokesperson hastened to add that the Commission still considered the "if" question as well. 194 In April 2015, the Commission said it plans to launch a consultation on data retention with relevant stakeholders. 195 It seems thus possible that the Commission will propose a new EU data retention obligation.
VIII CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed the regulation of mass metadata surveillance in Europe.
We focused on the Data Retention judgment, in which the Court of Justice of the European Union strikes down the Data Retention Directive that required the retention of metadata of almost all Europeans, to enable access to those data for authorities, in view of fighting serious crime and terrorism. The Court confirms that the mere collection of metadata about people interferes with privacy. In addition, the Court develops three new criteria for assessing the level of data security required from a human rights perspective. Security measures should take into account the risk of unlawful access to data, and the data's quantity and sensitivity. By connecting its ruling to the e-Privacy Directive and the general Data Protection Directive, the Court implicitly condemns the current legal regime for data security in EU law. Hence, the Court instructs the EU lawmaker to take responsibility for robust data security protections in future legislation. As such, the Data Retention judgment is a landmark ruling, which is good news for human rights. 
